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ImperfectInformationErrata
(2010-02-28,
KevinLeytonBrown
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---++ Chapter 5: Generalizing the Extensive Form: Imperfect-Information Games * *Page number:* * Section number: * Date: * Name: * Email: * Content: --- _The following errors were fixed in version 1.1:_ <br /> * *Page number: 48* * Section number: 5.3 * Date: 11/26/08 * Name: James Wright * Email: jrwright@cs.ubc.ca * Content: %RED%Theorem 5.3.3 should read "In extensive-form games of perfect information, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is exactly the set of sequential equilibria." %ENDCOLOR% * *Page number: 43* * Section number:5.2 * Date:7/21/09 * Name:Kevin Leyton-Brown * Content:I cut the following text. It's not wrong, but people were finding it confusing. On balance I think it hurt more than it helped, by focusing very strongly on differences between strategies that do not impact play. <br /><br />"The difference is substantive, and we illustrate it in the special case of perfect-information games. For example, consider the game of Figure 4.2. A strategy for player 1 that selects A with probability .5 and G with probability .3 is a behavioral strategy. In contrast, the mixed strategy (.6(A,G),.4(B,H)) is not a behavioral strategy for that player, since the choices made by him at the two nodes are not independent (in fact, they are perfectly correlated)." -- Main.KevinLeytonBrown - 21 Nov 2008
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