CONTENTS  PDF
 

Credits and Acknowledgments
Preface

 

1 Games in Normal Form
1.1 Example: the TCP user’s game
1.2 Definition of games in normal form
1.3 More examples of normal-form games
        1.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
        1.3.2 Common-payoff games
        1.3.3 Zero-sum games
        1.3.4 Battle of the Sexes
1.4 Strategies in normal-form games

 

2 Analyzing Games: From optimality to equilibrium
2.1 Pareto optimality
2.2 Defining best response and Nash equilibrium
2.3 Finding Nash equilibria

 

3 Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games
3.1 Maxmin and minmax strategies
3.2 Minimax regret
3.3 Removal of dominated strategies
3.4 Rationalizability
3.5 Correlated equilibrium
3.6 Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
3.7 Epsilon-Nash equilibrium
3.8 Evolutionarily stable strategies

 

4 Games with Sequential Actions: The perfect-information extensive form
4.1 Definition
4.2 Strategies and equilibria
4.3 Subgame-perfect equilibrium
4.4 Backward induction

 

5 Generalizing the Extensive Form: Imperfect-information games
5.1 Definition
5.2 Strategies and equilibria
5.3 Sequential equilibrium

 

6 Repeated and Stochastic Games
6.1 Finitely repeated games
6.2 Infinitely repeated games
6.3 Stochastic games
        6.3.1 Definition
        6.3.2 Strategies and equilibria

 

7 Uncertainty about Payoffs: Bayesian games
7.1 Definition
        7.1.1 Information sets
        7.1.2 Extensive form with chance moves
        7.1.3 Epistemic types
7.2 Strategies and equilibria
7.3 Computing equilibria
7.4 Ex post equilibria

8 Coalitional Game Theory
8.1 Coalitional games with transferable utility
8.2 Classes of coalitional games
8.3 Analyzing coalitional games
        8.3.1 The Shapley value
        8.3.2 The core

History and References
Bibliography
Index